This National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decision addresses whether students performing services for a university in connection with their studies are statutory employees under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The Regional Director had dismissed the petition filed by Graduate Workers of Columbia – GWC, UAW, which sought to represent graduate and undergraduate teaching assistants and graduate research assistants, by applying the precedent set in Brown University, 342 NLRB 483 (2004). In Brown University, the Board had determined that graduate student assistants were not employees because their relationship with the university was primarily educational, not economic.

The NLRB granted review and invited briefs on the central issue of whether to modify or overrule Brown University. The Board, in a decision by Chairman Pearce and Members Hirozawa and McFerran (with Member Miscimarra dissenting), overruled Brown University. The Board reasoned that the Brown University decision erred in its statutory interpretation by failing to acknowledge that the NLRA does not directly address this specific issue, thus requiring the Board to interpret the statute in light of its policies. The Board found that Brown University deprived an entire category of workers of the Act's protections without sufficient justification.

The NLRB established that student assistants who have a common-law employment relationship with their university are statutory employees under the Act. The broad definition of "employee" in Section 2(3) of the NLRA, which includes "any employee," and the absence of any statutory exclusion for students, support this conclusion. The Board emphasized that statutory coverage is permitted by virtue of an employment relationship, not foreclosed by the existence of an additional educational relationship. The Board's policy, as stated in Section 1 of the Act, is to encourage collective bargaining and protect employees' freedom of association.

The Board revisited its precedent, noting that prior to Brown University, its decision in New York University, 332 NLRB 1205 (2000) (NYU), had found graduate assistants to be statutory employees based on the common-law agency doctrine and the broad language of Section 2(3). The NYU Board found ample evidence that graduate assistants fell within the meaning of "employee" due to their performance of services under the university's control for compensation. This decision, however, was overruled by the sharply divided Brown University decision. The Brown University majority had focused on the "fundamental premise" of the Act being to cover "economic relationships" and declined to exercise jurisdiction over relationships that were "primarily educational," even if a common-law employment relationship existed. The Brown University majority also relied on policy considerations from St. Clare's Hospital, 229 NLRB 1000 (1977), regarding the unsuitability of collective bargaining for educational decision-making. The dissenters in Brown University, however, argued that the majority misapplied statutory principles and disregarded the plain language of the Act.

The NLRB majority in the present case found that the Brown University Board erred by concluding that student assistants could not be statutory employees as a matter of statutory interpretation. They reaffirmed the NYU approach, holding that where student assistants have a common-law employment relationship, this is sufficient to establish their status as statutory employees. The Board rejected the Brown University standard of "primarily educational" relationships, stating that the Act covers employment relationships and compelling reasons are needed for exclusion. The Board found that the existence of an educational relationship does not preclude an employment relationship under the Act.

Applying the revised standard, the Board concluded that all petitioned-for student-assistant classifications at Columbia University consist of statutory employees because they have a common-law employment relationship. This includes instructional officers (Teaching Assistants, Teaching Fellows, Preceptors, Readers/Graders) and research assistants (Graduate Research Assistants and Departmental Research Assistants). The Board found that these individuals perform services under the university's control for compensation.

Specifically regarding research assistants, the Board overruled Leland Stanford Junior University, 214 NLRB 621 (1974), which had previously excluded certain research assistants from employee status. The Board found that the reasoning in Leland Stanford was inconsistent with the common-law test and the Act's policies. The Board determined that research assistants at Columbia University do have a common-law employment relationship, as their work advances the university's research goals and is performed as a condition of receiving financial awards. The Board also addressed training grant recipients, finding them to be employees as well, as Columbia receives revenue from these grants and oversees the research assistants' training.

The Board also found that the petitioned-for bargaining unit, which included graduate and undergraduate teaching assistants and graduate research assistants, was appropriate. Columbia argued that the unit was inappropriate due to differences in pay, duties, and interests among the classifications. However, the Board found that all student assistants perform supplemental educational services that are integrated into the university's teaching and research mission, thus sharing a community of interest. While acknowledging some differences, the Board found sufficient similarities to support the proposed unit. The Board also rejected Columbia's argument that undergraduate and terminal Master's assistants should be excluded as temporary employees, finding that their finite tenure did not preclude meaningful bargaining and that they shared a community of interest with the other unit members.

Finally, the Board remanded the case to the Regional Director to establish an appropriate voting eligibility formula, recognizing the unique intermittent and semester-based employment patterns of student assistants.

Member Miscimarra dissented, arguing that the Board's decision improperly extends the NLRA to university students and disrupts the primary purpose of higher education: obtaining a degree at significant financial cost. He contended that the "industrial model" of the NLRA is ill-suited to the academic world and that collective bargaining, with its potential for economic weapons, could jeopardize students' academic progress and financial investment. He also argued that Board procedures are too slow and complex for the dynamic academic environment and that applying the NLRA would create conflicts with other federal statutes governing education. He believed that precedent, including Brown University and Leland Stanford, correctly held that student assistants are primarily students and not employees. He also argued that the broad array of student assistants in the proposed unit had too many dissimilarities to constitute an appropriate bargaining unit and that the inclusion of "temporary" employees like undergraduate and Master's assistants was improper.

Significant Cases Cited

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